The purpose of this article was to verify whether the update of bids and investor learning differ according to three experimental versions of initial public offers (IPO) methods. Investors learn about their performance and can improve their pricing decisions in successive experimental rounds.
INTRODUCTION
There are various methods to set the offer price in an Initial Public Offer (IPOs) of stocks but book building is the preferred method worldwide (JAGANNATHAN, SHERMAN, 2005; JAGANNATHAN, JIRNYI, SHERMAN, 2009 ). The underwriting market can be very competitive and underwriters usually keep the information they obtained during the pricing process private if local regulations permit. Thus, experiments are a way to infer what happens during a pricing process. Experimental IPO pricing includes the design of a pricing method simulation. Observers will be able to study subject behavior through the outcomes from repeated rounds of the process. Outcomes in the IPO experiments case will include bids, prices, returns and the reaction to new information, for example. Observers may also study bid updating and subject learning through repetition. The recent literature on experimental IPO methods brought about alternatives to deal with the possible shortcomings of book building, theoretically as well as empirically (BIAIS, BOSSAERTS, ROCHET, 2002; ZHANG, 2006 ZHANG, , 2009 TRAUTEN, LANGER, 2012; BONINI, VOLOSHYNA, 2013) .
The objective of this article is to ascertain if bid updating and subject learning differs according to three experimental versions of IPO methods. Subjects learn about their performance and may improve their pricing decisions in successive experimental rounds. Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman (2011) conjecture that rational (Bayesian) updating is present when there is improvement in investor bidding and better performance. Naive reinforcement leads to a deterioration of performance because investors participate in future rounds solely based on past successes and not on their analysis of future events. Bayesian and naive bid updating are the two forms of learning addressed here.
This study uses the data from the experiment performed in Almeida and Leal (2015) to investigate bid updating. These authors examined three experimental auction variations that they called "Dutch auction", "book building", and "competitive IPO". The first two emulated traditional methods that have been widely used in IPOs. The third method is a two-stage book building innovation used in some European IPOs designed to reduce potential conflicts of interest between issuers and underwriters. Their article was concerned with the joint comparison of pricing and welfare allocation efficiency among the three experimental methods in the same environmental setting, and did not address bid updating and learning. This article is motivated by gaps in the IPO methods experimental literature. Bonini and Voloshyna (2013) did not compare emulations of the three methods addressed herein jointly in Almeida, V. S.; Leal, R.P.C. Bayesian Bid Updating in Experimental IPO Pricing Methods. Revista de Finanças Aplicadas. V. 9, n.2, 2017. pp.84-104.
p. 5 the same experimental design. Besides, this study also offers a general experimental analysis of bid updating and learning considering the competitive IPO while Chiang et al (2011) used actual data from Taiwanese IPO auctions and Trauten and Langer (2012) compared different types of auctions to fixed price offers. Thus, the contribution to the experimental IPO methods literature is a more detailed study of the nature of investor learning and bid updating as participants receive information in each experimental round. In particular, the article probes bid updating in the three different IPO methods mentioned jointly, under the same experimental environment, including emulations of book building and the competitive IPO. Smith (1976) asserts that economic experiments are laboratory simplifications designed to capture the selected aspects of a real process. They are important to the theoretical testing and empirical comprehension of economic phenomena. Kagel (1995) declares that comparing experimental evidence is a challenge because of variations in experiment design and focus.
This article uses three experimental auction variations to represent the Dutch auction, book building, and the competitive IPO emulated under the same design. It does not contrast its results with those in the vast auctions literature, which by and large does not address IPO methods, focusing only on experiments about IPO methods. Subjects experience recurrent interactions and inform price and quantity to a non-discretionary underwriter in the latter two simulated IPO pricing methods. The experiments encompass solely pricing and allocate shares to winning bids on a pro rata basis. Naturally, real-world underwriters may be discretionary when they select investors for their repeated interactions and allocation after book building. This article also does not address allocation outcomes. These are limitations of the experimental design that hopefully will not affect the essential conclusions about bid updating.
The results herein evince Bayesian, but not naive updating, with "book building". The kind of updating with the "Dutch auction" is not clear. The bids were on average greater than optimal bids with the competitive IPO. Higher bids benefit issuers. The competitive IPO maintains the discretionary character of book building, which is apparently appreciated by underwriters, and could be advantageous if underwriters aspire to greater seller welfare. On the other hand, Almeida and Leal (2015) pointed out that "book building" was price efficient where as "competitive IPO" was not. This combined evidence supports the notion that the experimental "book building" is a better IPO pricing method relative to the other two laboratory versions analyzed. It is also consistent with the preference of the global underwriting community for book building. Section 2 presents a brief review of the related literature on IPO pricing methods. The design and procedure of the experiments is detailed in section 3. Section 4 discusses bid updating and learning and section 5 concludes. Lowry and Schwert (2004) and Almeida and Leal (2015) state that there is price efficiency when initial IPO market returns are close to zero. They concluded that book building is as price efficient as the Dutch auction. The competitive IPO is seller welfare efficient because it maximizes the offer proceeds but is not price efficient. The Dutch auction is the method that maximized buyer welfare. Almeida and Leal (2015) also infer that underwriters probably seek pricing efficiency because of their widespread preference for book building to price IPOs.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Specific Brazilian literature on IPO methods is scarce. Leal and Bocater (1992) (2000) contends that collusion may also be a problem if bidders can communicate privately. Bidders may collude tacitly as well when they observe the information other bidders convey. Markets, however, may achieve efficiency when bidders cannot communicate, even when they are very few.
Book building
Underwriters may simply play the role of public information aggregators in auctions.
They will not be able to allocate discretionarily and thus investors will not have stimulus to reveal private information. Sherman (2005) sustains that book building, on the other hand, allows 
Competitive IPO
A "bait and switch" scheme is one in which customers are initially lured by some teaser price, which they cannot really get, and then directed to lower quality or higher priced merchandise. Underwriters may use this stratagem to attract issuers with an enticing initial offer price range when bidding for the book building job. It is costly to replace an underwriter once hired. The appointed underwriter may gain material clout over the issuer and argue successfully in favor of a lower initial price range at the time of the actual sale to ease distribution and benefit the buyers they lined up during the book building process. The competitive IPO addresses "bait and switch". In book building, the lead underwriter conducts the IPO process, advising the issuer, making all the legal filings, and taking care of a myriad of required and managerial activities that must take place before the offer, including the road show, in the advising phase. It is also the lead underwriter that takes care of pricing and distributing the offer through an underwriting syndicate it puts together in the selling phase. There is a potential conflict of interest if the same institution is entrusted to carry out these two phases, as in book building. An underwriter encumbered solely with the advising phase (the advising institution) would charge for these services but would not be responsible to set the offer price. Underwriters entrusted to execute only the sale task (the selling institution) would have an incentive to set the offer price range higher if they compete for the job. The competitive IPO is the splitting of these two underwriting phases, which are bundled in book building, between the advising and selling underwriters selected according to a competitive process. The issuer naturally selects the one it believes will conduct each task better, according to whatever criteria it establishes, including setting a higher offer price range. The selling underwriters would have to set an offer price range in their bid for the selling task in a competitive selection that occurs towards the end of the advising phase.
The selling underwriter compensation may be a function of the price range. Jenkinson and Jones (2009a) describe the competitive IPO employed in some European offers and claim that it preserves the best qualities of book building.
METHODOLOGY
This article uses the results obtained in the Almeida and Leal (2015) experiments. This section will present their experiment design. Almeida and Leal (2015) used the Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments described in Fischbacher (2007) . Subjects are undergraduate and graduate students from a large public university in Brazil and professionals affiliated to a large Brazilian retail banking institution, experienced in portfolio management and company and industry research. paid to participants according to their performance and it could range from 5 to 25 US dollars. Table 1 shows that the average compensation in each round ranges from 9.50 to 10.50 US dollars. Table 1 also shows that there were 38 students and 49 professionals. Almeida and Leal (2015, p. 18) provide subject qualitative details. In summary, professional subjects are older (36) on average than students (26). Professionals had an average of ten years of experience.
There were 73 males and 14 females, and only 3 female professionals. Seventy-three subjects had some stock market experience, all but two of the professionals. However, the results in Almeida and Leal (2015) were essentially the same for students and professionals and so these two types of subjects will not be compared in this article. Table 2 shows the definitions of the variables. The virtual auctioneer draws the true share value V before each round but does not reveal it to subjects. Subjects also receive the lower (LPR) and upper (UPR) prices in the price range of the IPO, which are a function of V, disguised according to an adjustment factor, as depicted in Table 2 . The price range is public information. Each subject privately receives a different price signal (Si), a function of V as portrayed in Table 2 . It represents their inaccurate private IPO valuation. Kagel and Levin (1986, 1999) devised this informational structure, adopted here and in Almeida and Leal (2015) . The gain or loss of each subject in each round in a session, as a function of the offer price (P) and the quantity allocated to the subject (qi)
Gaini = (V -P) × qi P
The offer price The price asked by the virtual auctioneer that clears the offer in the "Dutch auction" and derived from the bids in the other methods
PS
The public signal
PS = (LPR + UPR)/2 Bi
The optimal bid for a subject in a round Bi = (Si + PS)/2
Thirty shares are offered in each IPO (round). The IPO is cancelled if demand is not sufficient to allocate all shares. Table 2 shows the definition of gain for each subject in each IPO (round). The total gain of each subject at the end of a session is the sum of the gains in its 24 rounds. Subjects received detailed instructions before each section that are available with the authors.
In the "Dutch auction" simulation, the auctioneer draws V and Si and determines the public price range. Subjects receive their private IPO valuation Si. The virtual auctioneer sets prices and subjects present their quantity bids. The virtual auctioneer announces a new and lower price if the offer quantity is not cleared, otherwise the round ends. Offer price drops are a percentage of V and are not too small to avoid protracted rounds. All bidders are allocated, fractionally in some cases. Subjects do not know the allocations of other participants but are, obviously aware of their gain or loss.
Like in the "Dutch auction", the auctioneer draws V and Si and determines the public price range in "book building". Subjects receive their private IPO valuation Si and present their price and quantity bids. The auctioneer builds the book in descending order of bid price. The offer price to all bidders is the bid price that clears the offer, i.e., the lowest priced winning bid. Almeida and Leal (2015) claim that their procedure randomized parameters more than other studies to hamper the ability of subjects to realize any misspecifications. Figure 1 depicts three scatter plots of the final prices resulting from the offer (P) according to each one of the three methods and of the true value (V) that corresponds to the market value of the stock at the end of the first trading day, randomly picked at the beginning of each round. A visual inspection of the charts in Figure 1 suggests that "book building" may result in higher initial returns (underpricing). restrictions on this behavior with their "competitive IPO". The dispersion of bids is greater under the "competitive IPO". Perhaps its more complex rules led to a greater differentiation in the strategies followed by subjects. Looking over the distribution of the adjustments between the fundamental values (private signals, Si) and bids, 6.7% of the bids were under -50% and 0.6%
BID UPDATING
were above 50% with "book building". "Competitive IPO" displayed 5.1% of the bids under -50% and 7% above 50%. There were more negative extreme bids under "book building" and more positive extreme bids under "competitive IPO". 
Figure 2
Initial returns from the first to the twenty-fourth round There could be potential learning effects resulting from the different weighting of the information subjects receive. Participants may solve a Bayesian updating problem before bids are submitted because they receive two pieces of information in each round: the private signal (Si) and the preliminary price range (LPR, UPR), which is public. They may revise their expectations as they receive new information about their performance and their learning may lead to better decisions (ARROW, 1962; GROSSMAN, KIHLSTROM, MIRMAN, 1977; KIHLSTROM, 1974) . In this article, better decisions refer to price only, and not other qualitative aspects described in Stigler (1961) , even though Bayesian updating is not the only form to analyze learning. Kahneman and Tversy (1972) 
Figure 3
Scatter plot of private signals (Si) and bids
The analysis addressed the experimental data with regards to potential rational (Bayesian) or naive reinforcement learning. Considering both types of learning, Kaustia and Knupfer (2008) and Chiang et al. (2011) suggest that investors are more likely to bid in future IPOs if they receive high returns from past IPOs. Chiang et al. (2011) state that the main difference between the two types of learning is that under a Bayesian updating scheme investors improve their bidding strategies, attaining superior performance, while under naive reinforcement inves- tor learning leads to worse performance because they simply believe that past successes are reason enough to participate in future events, regardless of any analysis of the quality and expected return of an IPO. They become less selective about their participation in future rounds and end up obtaining lower returns.
The optimal bid is the one that yields the highest expected return to a subject. The optimal bid for each subject in each round is based on the private signal (Si), the public price range (LPR, UPR), and on the clearing price of the round. The central value of the public price range is the public signal (PS). The price informed by the virtual auctioneer at the time a subject placed her quantity bid was the price bid in the "Dutch auction" case because subjects do not inform price bids in this IPO method. The optimal bid for a participant in a given round (Bi) is defined as the intermediate value between Si and the public signal PS. Alternatively, Bi = min {Si, PS}, with no relevant change in results, which will not be reported but are available upon request.
Optimal and actual bids were compared to verify whether bidders followed the optimal strategy, how close to the optimal strategy they were, and how learning evolved through time.
Investors bid by weighting the costs and benefits of acquiring information and private and public signals in the Chiang et al (2011) analysis with real data from Taiwan. Their strategy was updated conditioned on realized performance. In the setting in this study, subjects did not need to acquire information. Table 3 shows the analysis of bid updates considering the hypotheses of Chiang et al (2011) with regards to Bayesian and naive updating. Panel A of Table 3 shows that learning occurs according to Bayesian updating and not to naive updating in "book building". The results for the Dutch auction are not conclusive about any type of learning. Overall, participants bid higher than their optimal bid under the Dutch auction (1.147 times higher) and "competitive IPO" (1.069), while lower to their optimal bid under "book building" (0.915). These proportions are significantly different from each other at the 1% level according to a Mann-Whitney non-parametric test. is an open outcry descending price or clock auction. "Book building" refers to a sealed-bid uniform price auction and "competitive IPO" to a two-stage version of it. This analysis addresses sequential pairs of rounds of a subject, comparing bids of the subject in the round with allocation after the previous round with allocation. "Gain" and "loss" refer to the outcome in the first round with allocation in the pair. Positive updates, negative updates, and optimal bid are defined in the text. The bid over optimal bid proportions distributions are all significantly different from each other according to a Mann-Whitney non-parametric test at the 1% level of significance.
Panel B indicates that subjects more likely bid in the subsequent round under the "Dutch auction" and "book building" if they had a gain in the previous one. This is similar to the results reported by Chiang et al (2011) with real data from IPO auctions in the Taiwanese market.
However, Panel B does not display this behavior for the "competitive IPO". In the first stage of "competitive IPO" rounds, subjects had to bid knowing that if their bank reached the highest average bid its clients would obtain greater allocations than the clients of other banks. The public signal was then computed from this average bid and they were led to believe, initially at least, that V would very likely be in this range. As this did not happen, participants may have engaged in chasing higher returns given their very low and negative returns in the initial rounds. One may argue that participants would tend to skip many rounds in "competitive IPO"
given their losses but Panel B of Table 3 shows that this did not happen. However, as one reader of this paper pointed out, in the experiment they have nothing else to do but bid, while real investors have many other interests competing for their attention and efforts.
Panel C of Table 3 shows subject behavior after being allocated in a round. They more likely updated their bids positively with regards to their optimal bid after being allocated in a "book building" round (59.5% of bids following an allocation in the previous rounds after gain and 56.3% after loss). This was not the case after allocation in a "Dutch auction" (46.3%) or "competitive IPO" (49.3%) rounds after gain. "Book building" subjects were more likely (59.6%) to face gains from bidding in a subsequent offer after learning and updating, even though it is also the most price efficient method according to Almeida and Leal (2015) .
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence in this article derives from a setting in which bidders are informed and few, yet they did not attain their optimal bid and thus it is not likely that they would do so in the more complex actual IPO auctions. Investors are more likely to bid in the subsequent round if they had a gain in the previous round under the "Dutch auction" and "book building", which is similar to Chiang et al (2011) . Participants were more likely to positively update their bids with regards to their optimal bid after being allocated in an offer under "book building" but not as much under the "Dutch auction" and the "competitive IPO". "Book building" was the method where learning leads to gains more often. The updating analysis suggests that learning occurs according to Bayesian updating and not to naive updating in "book building". The results for the "Dutch auction" are not conclusive about any type of learning. The "competitive IPO" emulation bid were on average higher than the optimal bid. This benefits sellers but not buyers. The "competitive IPO" reduces underpricing while maintaining certain characteristics of book building, but it is not as price efficient according to Almeida and Leal (2015) . In general, the results in this article are consistent with the worldwide preference for book building.
The experimental setting and its outcomes have limitations that may be difficult to address. Experiments replace real data when they cannot be observed or are not available. A natural sequence for this work would to examine real Brazilian book building data, which underwriters keep private, as Chiang et al (2011) did. Researchers could seek a partnership with regulators in order to exam actual book building data, preserving the identity of investors, issuers, and underwriters. Researchers would need to convince regulators that a better understanding of price efficiency, bid updating, and investor learning in real book building situations could contribute to fine tune the IPO pricing method used in the country.
